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ABSTRACT 
Human rights, human development and human security form increasingly 
important, partly interconnected, partly competitive and misunderstood ethical 
and policy discourses. Each tries to humanize a pre-existing and unavoidable 
major discourse of everyday life, policy and politics; each has emerged within 
the United Nations world; each relies implicitly on a conceptualisation of 
human need; each has specific strengths. Yet mutual communication, 
understanding and co-operation are deficient, especially between human rights 
and the other discourses. The paper tries to identify respective strengths, 
weaknesses, and potential complementarity. It suggests that human security 
discourse may offer a working alliance between humanized discourses of 
rights, development and need. 
Keywords 
Human rights, human development, human needs, human security 
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1 FOUR ABODES IN THE HEAVEN OF HUMAN DISCOURSES1 
Ethical discourses can have great influence in national and international affairs. 
Neta Crawford’s Argument and Change in World Politics (2002) reviews five 
centuries of debates over imperial conquest, slavery and the slave trade, forced 
labour, colonization, trusteeship and decolonization. Crawford shows how 
ethical discourses can gradually structure and restructure pre-analytical feelings 
and analytical attention and how they can interact with and influence other 
factors—by the range of comparisons that they make, by the categories and 
default cases that they introduce and defend, by the ways they reconstitute 
conceptions of ‘interests’ and perceptions of constraints.   
I take this position on the potential of ethical discourses as a starting 
point—based also on work by, for example, Audie Klotz (1995), Craig Murphy 
(2005), and the UN Intellectual History Project (Jolly et al., 2005)—rather than 
seek to argue it at length here. But I start too from the findings by these and 
other authors that ethical discourses certainly do not necessarily have much or 
any influence, and that we should consider closely under which conditions and 
by which modalities which types of ethical discourse may exert which types of 
influence.  
In particular, ethical discourse that remains disembodied, freefloating and 
not built and embedded into legal frameworks and planning methodologies, 
may have much less effect in development policy; less than does religious 
discourse. Major attempts to embed ethics within development policy 
discourse in recent decades include: 
 The conventions on human rights, notably on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (1966), and those for women (CEDAW) and children 
(CRC) 
 The work on a Right to Development, from the 1970s on, via a UN 
General Assembly declaration in 1986, to a new wave of work since the 
late 1990s 
 Rights-Based Approaches to development: from the mid or late 1990s 
 The Basic (Human) Needs work, mainly in the 1970s and 80s 
 The successor capability approach (Sen), Human Development Approach 
(Haq), and capabilities approach (Nussbaum), from the late 1980s 
onwards, wings of a cooperative endeavour consolidated recently in a 
Human Development And Capability Association 
 The perspective of Human Security, from the mid 1990s. This is less 
embedded, at least as yet, but has received considerable attention in the 
last few years, led by the 2003 report Human Security Now, as in effect an 
attempt in the threatening setting of the new millennium to link the 
                                                 
1 My thanks for their comments go to participants at the NFU 2006 conference in 
Oslo and in two GARNET meetings and other presentations in The Hague and 
Leiden. 
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perspectives of human rights, needs, and human development, via the 
lenses of felt and actual vulnerabilities.  
The present paper looks at the relationship between these discourses, at 
their potentials and requirements, competitiveness and complementarity. We 
will group the first three in the list above as a human rights stream, as is 
standard in the literature, while noting its component strands. As explained 
below, the other three strands can be grouped together too, as a development 
set, associated with a body like UNDP. We give particular attention to the 
discourse of human security, since it is the most recent and least familiar and 
consciously attempts to integrate the other three streams. I have discussed 
elsewhere its relations to discourses of human development (Gasper and 
Truong, 2005) and needs (Gasper, 2005a, 2005b) and draw on that work here. 
In this paper I thus give relatively less attention to the discourses of human 
development and needs, and more attention to the discourse of human rights 
and its relations, actual or potential, to the others.  
Section 2 will raise some key concerns for discourses of human rights 
(HR) and of human needs (HN). Section 3 tries to identify the contributions 
and limitations of ‘human development’ (HD) discourse, leading on to an 
assessment of what if anything ‘human security’ (HS) discourse adds. Section 4 
attempts comparisons and an integrated evaluation. I implicitly draw 
throughout the paper on ideas from Crawford and Murphy concerning 
determinants and modalities of influence, to inform the analysis of strengths 
and weaknesses, opportunities and threats. That will lead to identification of 
some possible directions for follow-up.  
The four families of discourse form parts of a larger genus: all use the 
epithet ‘human’. All add a distinctive human interpretation to a preexisting 
stream of thought and practice: they propose and stress unities amongst all 
human beings, and simultaneously perhaps provide a contrast to (other) 
animals, let alone inanimate entities; and they stress a moral prioritization of 
certain capacities and potentials. Human rights is a language of fundamental 
entitlements, contrasted with the preexisting language of legally embedded 
rights, not least of property rights. Human needs discourse tries to provide a 
basis for this moral prioritization, by assessing ‘needs for what and for whom?’ 
and distinguishing the needs of habit or addiction from reasoned and 
reasonable priority. Human Development stands opposed to inhuman 
development; and the concept of Human Security stands in contrast to state 
security and to exclusive attention to security of property or bodily security. 
Not coincidentally, three of the discourses—human rights, human 
development, human security—are in important degree United Nations 
discourses, even if far from exclusively so. The language and practices of 
human rights have spread far down the global ladder. Human development 
discourse has rapidly extended to national and regional levels, providing 
through its annual reports a widely adopted language and perspective. While 
many of the recent Human Development Reports (HDRs) have taken human 
security (HS) as their theme (Jolly & BasuRay, 2007) and there is considerable 
academic research interest, HS discourse is more complex and more disputed. 
There are conflicting claimants to the HS label and fundamental doubts about 
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the turn to security language. We add the fourth discourse, of human need, to 
this trio because it provides a grounding for the others.  
Within the genus of human discourses, the relationships – like 
relationships in many other human families – are often surprisingly distant, 
even cold. Two main subgroupings with more internal interconnection exist 
within the genus: Human Rights and the rest. The latter we can call, with Philip 
Alston and others, the development grouping. In a wider-ranging analysis one 
could with Uvin and others distinguish four source communities of practice—
socio-economic development, conflict, humanitarian emergency relief, and 
human rights. Here we mostly look only at partners or reflections of the latter 
three streams of practice that are found in the socio-economic development 
field: human security, basic human needs, and rights-based development. Thus 
for our purposes development and rights are the two broader groupings.  
Despite much work at their interfaces in the past generation, these two 
remain to a large degree ‘Ships Passing in the Night’ (Alston, 2005; see also 
Uvin, 2004, 2006). The picture given of ‘the development enterprise’ in two 
recent important presentations of rights-based approaches (Gready & Ensor, 
2005; Uvin, 2004), for example, is far too narrow.2 Even with respect to a 
project such as the Millennium Development Goals, Alston shows how work 
on the MDGs, national and global, has paid very little attention to human 
rights conventions and theory; and conversely how human rights organisations 
have remained predominantly detached from perhaps the central 
contemporary program in the international development field. MDG 
monitoring and human rights monitoring mechanisms have largely ignored 
each other (Alston, 2005: 814-25). ‘Making the language and approach of 
human rights accessible to wider audiences has proved difficult’ admits 
perhaps the leading figure who is attempting that, Mary Robinson, the 
inspiring former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights who spearheaded 
the move of human rights work out of its traditional ruts (Robinson, 2004: 
868). ‘…we are far from arriving at a position where those working in the 
human rights tradition and those working in the development tradition feel 
that they speak the same language. If mutual curiosity has increased, 
confidence is far from being safely established’ (Robinson, 2005: 31). 
Viewed in historical perspective, however, the new half-fullness of the 
relationship between these streams (see e.g. Olowu, 2005) may strike the 
observer even more than the remaining half-emptiness and mutual strangeness. 
‘Over more than half a century, the four original pillars of the [UN] Charter 
(peace, development, human rights, and independence) largely pursued in 
parallel in the first few decades, came closer together, a remarkable and 
underemphasized advance. The integration of these important facets of the 
human challenge may be the most underrecognised achievement of the world 
                                                 
2 Uvin presents ‘the development enterprise’ as much younger than that of human 
rights (p.12), because bizarrely it is equated by him to international development 
assistance (p.13). Other resources than those controlled by ‘development agencies’ are 
even defined as ‘nondevelopment resources’ (p.119). (See also Uvin 2004: 35-37.) 
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TABLE 1  
Some recent evolution of ideas of human rights, human needs, human development, human security 
 DEVELOPMENT Intersection NEEDS Intersection HUMAN RIGHTS Intersection DEVELOPMENT 
1940s-60s Emergence of 
national development 
plans 
andinternational 
development 
cooperation 
 Humanistic psychology. 
National social welfare 
schemes. 
Growth of international 
humanitarianism.  
Geneva Convention on 
protection of civilians in 
war time 
1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human 
Rights. 
1966 Human Rights 
conventions 
 Origins of development 
studies 
1970s-80s Growing reliance on 
market principles of 
valuation, allocation 
Development ethics (Denis 
Goulet et al.). 
Basic Needs Approach. 
Sen on famine. 
Needs analysis of 
conflict (John Burton, 
Galtung et al.), Æ human 
security type framework. 
Basic Rights (Henry 
Shue) 
Entitlements analysis 
(Sen) 
 1986 UN statement on 
Right to Development. 
Generalisation of 
Entitlements analysis 
Growth of attention to: 
women, employment,  
environment, culture … 
1980s-90s Growing reliance on 
market principles of 
organisation. 
Capability approach 
(Sen) 
‘Human-scale Development’ 
(Max-Neef et al., 1986). 
‘Adjustment with a human 
face’ (UNICEF, 1987). 
Human Development 
(UNDP, 1990) 
Max-Neef’s theory of 
needs 
Braybrooke’s and Doyal 
& Gough’s theories of 
need 
Needs as the basis of 
rights: Galtung 
Conventions on women 
and children 
Vienna Declaration 
1993: indivisibility of Civil 
& Political Rights and 
Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights 
Increasing assertion of 
property rights 
Mid 90s – 
now 
‘Social 
Development’. 
Conflict. 
(Sustainable) 
Livelihoods Approach 
Centrality of health 
asserted. 
Human Security (HDRs 
1993-4; CHS, 2003). 
International Development 
Targets 
Well-being and ill-being 
research. 
Ryan & Deci: self-
determination theory  
Jubilee 2000: principles 
for debt relief. 
Growing emphasis on 
duties to protect and 
promote as well as not to 
violate human rights 
Right to Development 
(Sengupta).  
HDR 2000. 
Rights Based 
Approach(es). 
Nussbaum’s affiliation to 
and Sen’s qualified 
endorsement of HR 
approach. 
Intellectual property 
rights; TRIPS. 
Capabilities approach 
(Nussbaum) 
Trends in 
2000s 
 MDGs. 
Human Security language 
connects to rights 
Work on (un)-
sustainable 
consumption. 
Extreme Poverty as an 
HRs Violation (Pierre 
Sane, Thomas Pogge) 
Rights Based Global 
Order (Mary Robinson, 
David Held, Pogge, et 
al.) 
Human Rights Based 
Approaches. 
Rights to food, water, 
etc. 
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organisation’ (Jolly, Emmerij & Weiss, 2005: 12). Table 1 outlines some of the 
intersections. These greatly increased from the 1970s, leading to important new 
thinking within the development and human rights pillars themselves. 
Human development discourse has connected to human rights discourse 
notably in the HDR 2000 and the spawning of human security discourse. The 
HDR 2000 presented ‘human development’ as a justification principle for 
rights, and human rights language as an essential format in policy 
operationalization. Such a linkage could be helpful both for human 
development work, connecting it to the politically vivid, forceful and 
institutionally embedded human rights approach; and for human rights 
discourse, providing it with fuller theoretical grounding and clearer priorities. 
Leading current formulations of human rights, human development, and 
human needs theory can be seen to have the same structure (see Gasper, 2005a 
or 2005b), with the justification of many claimed human rights to be 
understood in terms of fulfilment of priority needs. While human needs 
discourse has been more a part of the second subgrouping (human 
development thinking), it can play an essential role in connecting the streams 
(see e.g. Galtung, 1994) and will be discussed here together with human rights 
thinking, in Section 2. In Section 3 we see how human security discourse 
thereby builds an alliance between the three older ‘human’ discourses. It uses a 
human needs framework to provide the focus in prioritization that is required 
within the very wide reach of the human rights and human development 
discourses. 
2 HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN NEEDS: THE IMPORTANCE 
OF CHANNELLING AND PARTNERING THE RIGHTS 
NOTION 
Fundamental Strengths of an HRBA? 
Core contributions of a human rights based approach (HRBA) are: first, to 
offer a defence for the weak, each and every weakly situated person, 
counteracting elite dominance (Darrow & Tomas, 2005: 489); and second, to 
ground this defence in fundamental motivating forces: respect for human 
dignity and—even for people who have lost or never fulfilled their dignity in 
another sense—respect for common humanity, a respect for each and every 
person. Human rights are a powerful instrumental tool for defence of the 
weak, a tool that derives its instrumental power from the fact that it has 
independent normative appeal. Ordinary people can and do grasp and use the 
human rights concept (see e.g. Tomas, 2005); and the fact that people hold 
such values makes rights systems an effective policy instrument and driving 
force.  
Lawyers typically propose two more core strengths. The third that they 
repeatedly stress is that the moral claims for defence of the weak and of all 
persons are embodied in a system of specific criteria, entitlements with 
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carefully specified, intersubjectively stable content (Alston, 2005, e.g. 760, 782; 
Darrow & Tomas, 2005, e.g. 519-20).3 Non-lawyers highlight instead that the 
concept of human rights helps to redirect and restructure our attention in 
policy analysis and action: it changes where we look, the questions we ask, and 
how we try to answer them (Uvin, 2004: 176, 192; Gasper, 2007b). 
Fourthly, lawyers emphasise that a human rights based approach connects 
to the rigour, force and compulsion of law, the machinery of legal 
decisionmaking and enforcement wherein rights are clarified, including by 
specification of duty-holders, and applied. However, argue some others, this 
orientation to the legal system can instead become a failing. The legal system is 
inevitably ponderous and remains in practice dominated by the rich, those who 
can access the courts, hire smart lawyers, or buy support in other ways. In 
addition, it might merge the human rights approach into a more general legal 
language-field of rights, within which the rights of most or many humans can 
become marginalized for the sake of property rights or so-called group rights. 
While ethical principles need to become embodied, the question is how far 
legal systems alone can be relied on to embody and apply them. 
A strength of recent Rights Based Approaches (RBAs) work is their 
reduction of the preoccupation with the legal system – ‘the legal reflex’ 
(Gready and Ensor, 2005). RBAs concentrate on research and information 
provision, education and capacity building, influencing incentives, motivations 
and concepts, supporting public debate, and pressure via the political system. 
Alston considers these new RBAs far more fruitful than more legalistic and 
lawbook-bound work on the Right to Development (Alston, 2005, Section VI). 
Seeing rights as goals to be promoted in diverse ways, not only as legal cudgels 
with which to enforce, leads to more creative thinking: ‘In cases where rights 
cannot be enforced through the courts [notably because there is not a single 
clear duty-holder], they can be asserted [and promoted - DG] through other 
democratic means, based for instance on parliamentary interventions, the 
electoral process, the media, international solidarity, street action or even civil 
disobedience’ (Drèze, 2005: 58). Many of these methods act through ‘influence 
on public perceptions of who is entitled to what’ (ibid.: 59). 
The label RBA would be unfortunate if it helped to trap the poor into 
primary reliance on a legal system which they can hardly ever effectively use. 
‘Human Rights Based Approach(es)’ is a better label, as used by for example 
Robinson (2005) and Darrow & Tomas (2005). HRBAs have emerged 
precisely to correct and override narrower RBAs.  
The disagreements over the third and fourth proposed strengths of human 
rights-based approaches, including over the role of legalism, illustrate that there 
is no single RBA (Mander, 2005). Each organisation seems to present its own 
core principles. Both Darrow & Tomas (2005: 471) and Alston (2005: 799 ff.), 
                                                 
3 See ICHRP (2005, Ch.II) for a more elaborate comparison along those lines of 
human rights approaches with human development, good governance, and gender 
equity approaches. It underweights the typical problems in HRAs which we will 
consider: grounding, prioritization, and legalism. 
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in their massive recent surveys, warn of the danger of disillusion with loosely 
conceptualised and applied RBAs. Besides the issue of legalism, two other 
fundamental disputes require attention: the handling of trade-offs and setting 
of priorities, and, related to that, the theoretical grounding for human rights 
claims. We will consider these three areas further, after an overview of 
objections to rights language. 
Rights Claims and their Critics 
We should distinguish: rights language in general; within that, human rights 
language; and within human rights language, approaches centred on legal rights 
and broader human rights-based approaches (Table 2). 
TABLE 2 
Realms of rights approaches 
RIGHTS APPROACHES  
NOT HUMAN RIGHTS HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW-CENTRED Diverse non-primal legal rights Human rights law & 
conventions 
NOT LAW-CENTRED Informal non-primal rights Wider HR-based approaches 
 
 
Let us note first some criticisms of rights language in general, then of 
human rights in particular. These concerns lead us to such languages’ need for 
partner discourses. 
Rights language, in the variants that take rights as primary, central, and 
overriding, has been criticised in some, greater or lesser, degree from almost all 
angles in political and social philosophy except that of ‘Liberal individualism, 
then, to which the theory of rights belongs’ (Almond, 1993: 267).4 Nearly all 
the critics accepted that rights have a role in a political order, but as a derived 
and more limited tool, not as absolute or predominant nor as a foundational 
principle such as ‘natural rights’ or ‘human rights’. Many utilitarians have taken 
such a position, for example as in Bentham’s famous attack of 1795 on natural 
rights.  
 Economists have traditionally often disliked (human) rights talk: it gets in 
the way of aggregate utility- (or product-) maximization, and they query 
who is supposed to pay for these asserted rights (see, e.g., views in Frey, 
1984). 
 Certain leading conservative philosophers, such as Alisdair MacIntyre and 
Roger Scruton, have been critical of rights formulations, as are some 
feminists (e.g., Hardwig, 1990). The Kantian Onora O’Neill (1996) argues 
                                                 
4 See Sumner (2000) for a concise but solid survey of, and partial reply to, objections.  
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that obligations is a more basic (and broader) category than rights and 
gives a more adequate moral basis. (For a rebuttal, see Nussbaum, 2006.) 
Similarly, from the Thomist tradition, John Finnis (1980) prefers the 
language of duties to that of rights. 
 Many Marxists consider rights talk as part of an ideology by which an elite 
in reality grabs resources and excludes others (Buchanan, 1982; Lukes, 
1985). Some radical democratic theorists too hold that rights formulations 
in practice entrench bourgeois power and property. Lawrence Hamilton, a 
South African political philosopher, attacks the human rights framework 
as a dead end for justice in his country: one part of a spider’s web of 
bourgeois liberal thought through which the weak are captured by the 
strong. Hamilton criticises a dominant ‘rights-preferences couple’ in 
“liberal political and economic theory and practice that reduces politics to 
the security of individual human rights, the aggregation of individual 
preferences, or a contrived combination of both. This reduction excludes 
the two main components of politics: collective decision determined by 
the need to act, and collective evaluation determined by the requirement 
to control and enhance the development and satisfaction of individual 
human needs” (Hamilton, 2004: 193). Further, although ‘human rights’ 
discourse makes a claim for priority status, rights language bears too much 
the imprint of property rights, and ties fulfilment of priority human needs 
to the ability to expensively access a remote legal system. That system 
takes existing property rights as the default case: claims against them must 
be demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt. Basic needs of the majority 
can thus become downgraded in practice by being stated in the same 
rights language as that of established propertyholding (Hamilton, 2003a: 
Conclusion). 
Some of the criticisms are specific to human rights claims, such as the 
familiar attacks on their proposed universality.5 Human rights language is partly 
formally established in law, often not, and comprises claims to hold or obtain 
something because of a person’s sheer status as a human being, thereby 
overriding if necessary many other possible rights. Freeman calls this a ‘very 
unsatisfactory formulation’ (2002: 60-61). I would say rather that it is not a 
complete argument by itself; one has to argue effectively which of the features 
of being a human imply rights, and why, and which rights and with what 
degree of force (see e.g. Josephides, 2003). 
More selective in their target are critics of economic and social rights in 
particular, whether on utilitarian, conservative, or other grounds. A prominent 
conservative critic was Maurice Cranston. In contrast, many nationalists hold 
that the international human rights regime is a tool for imperialists to interfere 
and intervene when it suits them, while ignoring real need most of the time. 
Discussing human rights in an international context can render weak states 
                                                 
5 For example: Wood (2003) doubts the relevance of some of the gender and marriage 
rights charter to poor societies where marriages are a key security arrangement for 
which there is no alternative. 
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open to intervention, and human rights becomes seen as an imperialist 
discourse – at least by actual or aspirant ruling groups in the South.6 
From the Human Development stream, Amartya Sen wants to loosen up 
and deabsolutise human rights discourse (e.g. Sen, 2004); Martha Nussbaum 
thinks likewise, based on her intense involvement with the world of American 
law. At the same time, both now consciously affiliate to the international 
human rights tradition, in a deabsolutised form; ‘the capabilities approach is 
one species of a human rights approach’ says Nussbaum (2006: 7). Li (2001) 
considers that Nussbaum’s approach thereby faces the same fundamental 
challenges as a human rights approach: 
… over the past decade, in responding to criticisms and doubts, the main 
architects of the capability theory have gradually moved toward mainstream 
liberal constitutionalism and the international human rights approach.  … a 
number of conceptual difficulties that the international human rights approach 
faces, such as the lack of specification of correspondent duties, the extensiveness 
of the list of rights declared “universal” and “human,” which thus must all be 
protected and implemented, and the expensiveness in implementing them, can 
also be raised about the capability approach. 
To sum up, disagreements exist on: 1 - the status of rights relative to other 
principles; 2 - the content of rights; 3 - the relative importance of different 
rights (human rights can conflict with each other and with other sorts of 
rights); 4 - the meaning of justice and hence the grounding of rights 
(disagreements here underlie disagreements on the previous points); and 5 - the 
relative importance and role of different aspects of justice (commutative; 
procedural; distributive; contributive; retributive). Human rights theory 
requires then: a grounding, a prioritising apparatus, much complementing, and 
careful gradation and some deabsolutisation. 
Let us consider in more detail the accusations of legalism, vagueness of 
grounding, and utopianism/absolutism. (Robinson, 2005 discusses other 
criticisms.) 
Will Democratic Agendas Be Sunk or Strengthened by Rights 
Frameworks? Is a Legalistic Language an Advantage or Not? 
The concept of rights can be used selfishly, but all concepts can be abused… 
(Freeman, 2002: 73). 
We have a choice between saying that human rights is a good concept which 
can be abused; or that human rights is a concept which can be used well and 
for good ends but also can be used badly and for bad ends. The advantage of 
the former stance is that it may better instil confidence and commitment; the 
advantage of the latter is that we become more self-critical, less self-
                                                 
6 Whereas natural rights typically derived from God, human rights doctrine creates a 
sort of secular God: ‘we have rights by virtue of being human and once we institute a 
global legal order we have a kind of global god. Monotheistic colonialism is alive and 
well.’ (Hamilton 2003b: 45) 
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congratulatory. We saw already a potential structural advantage, the force of 
legal backing, and a structural problem, namely that reliance on the legal system 
typically favours elites and disfavours those who are remote from and/or 
distrust the state. ‘This [second part] is a challenge which human rights 
organizations have only recently understood’ (Robinson, 2005: 37). 
Rights language—including sometimes human rights language as used in 
practice—is far from necessarily egalitarian. Historically, rights language has 
often been associated with defending privileges or claiming privileges: benefits 
to be received by some and certainly not by all. Rights language—including the 
language of fundamental rights—is frequently used to defend immense 
inequalities and monopolistic practices.7 
So, if human rights is a language of special priority, where do human rights 
end and other rights begin? Everyone wants to claim priority for their interests. 
Each sort of claimed right is in practice liable to be defended by saying that it 
represents a human right, as in the argument by Robert Nozick and Right 
libertarians that income taxation represents a violation of fundamental human 
rights to gain and hold property by fair means, and a violation of a person’s 
integrity and human right to be treated with utmost respect. Nozick’s 
libertarian attack on John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, glitzily titled Anarchy, 
State and Utopia (1974), presented anti-egalitarianism as cool, smart, and pro-
people. Arguments about fair, timeless ‘social contracts’ were opposed by 
arguments in terms of actual, historical contracts. Such arguments, for the 
absolute right to hold on to property and experience minimal interference, 
contributed to the 1970s and 1980s rise to dominance of neo-liberal and neo-
conservative views, propounded by von Hayek, Friedman, Nozick and many 
others (see Gasper, 1986). This was amongst the reasons why land reform, for 
example, largely disappeared from the policy agenda. It connects also to the 
rise of the thinking and practice of ‘intellectual property rights’, the patenting 
by corporations of what others consider to be a common heritage, and the 
attempts by corporations to limit the use of knowledge that can save the lives 
of impoverished millions unless they are paid the price that they demand. 
Even the Bretton Woods institutions now talk about human rights, 
though when they refer to ‘the rule of law’ they have typically attended only to 
property rights (Alston, 2005: 780). We have to face the question: how far are 
property rights human rights? To address it we would need to consider the 
theoretical grounding of human rights claims. 
                                                 
7 Microsoft’s refusal to give customers the freedom to buy Windows separately from 
Internet Explorer was defended with use of the language of freedom and rights: it 
prioritised Microsoft’s freedom to manipulate customers. See e.g. ‘A Petition Against 
the Persecution of Microsoft’, www.moraldefense.com. 
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The Grounding and Weight of Human Rights Claims: 
Prioritisations, Choices, Trade-Offs 
One cannot by fiat limit ‘human rights thinking’ to UN human rights 
documents and sister legal statements. It antedates 1948, and, further, the 1948 
Universal Declaration is a list without an explicit theory. Attempts to theorise 
can lead to somewhat different lists; for example, some do not include 
property rights as a human right, at least not of the same order as others. 
Property rights are included in the 1948 Declaration but were excluded from 
the 1966 Conventions. The assertion of property rights as human rights of 
equal priority to others undermines redistributive public activity – not merely 
land reform but also many forms of taxation. A massively wealthy movement 
mobilised in recent years in the USA to abolish inheritance taxation, and 
similar groups have placed income taxation on their target list. 
Declarations of normative rights rest on conceptions of values and justice, 
and, in turn, on conceptions about other things. Fortunately, various different 
conceptions of values and justice may be consistent with the same declaration 
of normative rights; this is enormously helpful and has been a reason to not 
probe into the underlying conceptions. However there are also major 
disagreements, which force us to probe further. 
We require a normative grounding in order to not only specify a list but 
also interpret and use it: what are priorities when different rights, or rights and 
other values, conflict? As human rights leaders like Robinson (2005) and 
Alston (2005: 802) acknowledge, the tradition has been averse to admitting 
conflicts of rights. Peter Uvin holds that ‘the human rights community has 
hardly addressed’ how conflicts between rights should be handled (2004: 186). 
In practice, lawyers and administrators must and do consider such matters, and 
build up various conventions of practice, but the basis of theory can be weak. 
One dangerous option is to hold that rights which are given lesser priority in a 
particular case are then ‘not real rights’ (cf. Gasper, 1986). Uvin (2004) looks at 
prioritisation in his final chapter but does not distinguish contingent conflicts, 
namely those due to current shortage of resources, and inherent conflicts, 
those that no amount of resources will remove. 
One possible role of principles is as inspirational maxims, proverbs, which 
one endorses without openly admitting that they are sometimes contradicted 
by other maxims. They are used as reminders, and conflicts are treated as 
challenges, as spurs to creative improvisation and never to admission of 
constraint. When may one take a step backwards on some valued axis in order 
to take two steps forward on another axis or later on the same axis? The 
human rights mainstream seems to say: never. Uvin (2004: 151) hallows this as 
‘the non retrogression rule’. Others call it the ‘do no harm principle’. The 
implicit assumption is that one can and must always find feasible ways of 
immediately compensating for any retrogression that would otherwise be 
incurred. Non-inspirational analysts and managers from other traditions 
consider this absurd: it even jeopardises, as we saw, most taxation. Robinson 
(2005: 35ff.) accepts that ‘human rights analysts have not thought enough 
about’ such problems. But Darrow and Tomas take the counter offensive 
(2005: 492), and insist that HRBA in fact forces us to face conflicts. It indeed 
obliges us to look at costs incurred by individuals and groups, but this is not 
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the whole of the issue. We can be forced to see conflicts, but we may fail to 
have any system for prioritising in response to them. Or, we may adopt the 
non-retrogression rule which asserts only one way of dealing with any conflict, 
the way of full compensation; and which can lead in strange directions, when 
rich and privileged groups—those who are best able to articulate and advocate 
their interests and operate in systems of law—adopt the languages of absolute 
respect for persons and of uninfringeable rights, in order to defend their 
holdings.  
We have here a conflict and trade-off between two styles of practice: an 
optimistic inspirational quasi-religious style, that calls us to join the path of 
righteousness, and a more prosaic, calculating style. Each has its strengths and 
appropriate locales. In public and global policy, Romantic inspiration is 
important but will not suffice. Alston, one of the major figures in human rights 
research, is more hardheaded and critical here than Darrow, Robinson or Uvin: 
(H)RBAs must acquire priorities, an understanding of the division of mandates 
and responsibilities, and a grasp of the inevitability of phased change (Alston, 
2005: 807-8); otherwise they could become a counterproductive theology. 
Correspondingly, they should ally themselves to the MDGs. ‘In the future, 
human rights proponents need to prioritize, stop expecting a paradigm shift, 
and tailor their prescriptions more carefully to address particular situations’ 
(ibid.: 826-7). 
Some types of need theory, and their offspring in one version of the 
human security approach, offer a way of thinking, not just a set of labels, to 
engage in the necessary prioritization. 
The Importance of Needs Theory, and of History of Ideas 
Rather Than Creation Myths 
Basic needs normative theory is one systematic way to look at normative 
foundations, for rights or for any other normative theory. It asks: 
 What are the requirements for a person to live in a way required by a 
particular normative theory?; e.g., to live as an independent, self-reliant, 
autonomous (self-directing) individual of the sort praised in a Nozick-type 
rugged individualism. In other words, it argues that each normative theory 
implies some basic needs. 
 What are the implied requirements that are common to a whole range of 
normative theories? Some priority needs are found to be the same across a 
wide range of normative theories. These ones we can confidently call basic 
needs despite the disagreements elsewhere between the theories. 
So, looking for foundations for rights (or other normative stances) leads 
somewhere, says needs theory (see e.g. Braybrooke, 1987; Doyal & Gough, 
1991; Gasper, 2004, Ch.6; Gasper, 2007a). Conversely, failure to look 
systematically at foundations and to conceptualise needs carefully can lead to 
confusion. One common form of confusion arises from failure to distinguish 
modes of ‘need’, and another comes from presumption that basic needs means 
a set of  commodities that sustain material subsistence. 
A minimum set of distinctions specifies three modes and two levels. Mode 
A needs are drives, or strong wants, or things without which one suffers; Mode 
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B needs are what one requires (S, a satisfier) in order to achieve something else 
(E, an end); Mode C needs (a subset of mode B) are approved requisites for 
fulfilling approved priority ends (like dignity) (Taylor, 1959; Douglas et al., 
1998). Essential requisites (such as water) for strong priority ends (such as life) 
are candidate human rights. Within modes B and C we must distinguish levels 
of satisfiers and ends. Obviously not all mode A and mode B needs are mode 
C needs and candidate human rights; but candidate human rights are mode C 
needs or the approved priority ends. 
Michael Freeman cites Jack Donnelly, that ‘the need for dignity rather 
than needs as such is the basis of human rights’ (Freeman, 2002: 65). Freeman 
queries Donnelly, arguing that ‘the link between human rights and “dignity” is 
as problematic as the link with “needs”: the right to security of person, for 
example, might be based on human need or a requirement of dignity’ 
(Freeman, 2002: 65). In reality there is no dichotomy: the (satisfier-level) 
implications of a requirement of dignity would be one type of (mode C) human 
need. Thus when Freeman later remarks that ‘The combined use of needs and 
dignity is implicit in the “capabilities” theory of Martha Nussbaum’ (loc. cit.), it 
is not that some of her priority areas are based on needs and some on dignity; 
they are all, in her view, the needs required for sustaining a life with dignity. 
Freeman rightly notes: ‘Most people most of the time “need” security, but 
it is not always needed for a life of dignity; soldiers, for example…’ (Freeman, 
2002: 65). From this we might conclude that soldiers do not have a right to 
security or have waived that right; that dignity is not the only priority end; or 
that rights to security are grounded in particular (E-level) needs, whether for 
dignity, or for being able to live as the type of agent assumed by whichever 
moral theory is adopted. That not all needs establish rights (e.g., some needs, 
such as friendship, ‘would impose unreasonable demands on others’ if stated as 
rights; ibid.), does not gainsay that ‘Behind human rights are freedoms and 
needs so fundamental that their denial puts human dignity itself at risk’ 
(Goldewijk & Fortman, 1999: 117).  
The creation myths of both human rights based approaches (HRBA) and 
the human development approach (HDA) present basic needs theory as a 
primitive forerunner: technocratic, top-down, commodity-focused, a staging 
post on the path to right thinking. This sits uneasily with the fact that leading 
basic needs theorists—like Mahbub ul Haq, Paul Streeten, Frances Stewart, 
Johan Galtung—were also leaders of HDA or HRBA. Peter Uvin is 
representative here in describing the basic needs approach—which he 
considers still tacitly predominant in development work—as follows: ‘All 
human beings, it is argued, have basic material needs for food, material, and 
shelter, and all development activities and policies should first of all promote 
the satisfaction of these basic needs; only after that is done should more social 
and psychological needs be addressed’ (emphases added; Uvin, 2004: 34). This 
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suggests scant knowledge of the work of leading basic needs theorists,8 and of 
the oft discussed contrast between the ‘basic material needs’ and ‘basic human 
needs’ streams (see e.g. Hettne, 1982, 1990). The reductionist broadbrush 
treatment contrasts with Uvin’s concern to tease out variants and alternatives 
within human rights approaches.  
Reductionism becomes sloppiness when Uvin returns to the theme in his 
Chapter 4. If inmates of refugee camps have better indicators for nutrition, 
morbidity, mortality, and shelter than before they entered the camps, then 
according to him ‘the basic needs and even “human development” approach as 
implemented by the main development actors’ (p.123) would conclude these 
people are ‘more developed’ than before. He remarks that ‘We intuitively feel 
that this is nonsense, of course. When people are deprived of their freedom, 
live in constant fear, cannot move or work as they wish, and are cut off from 
the communities and the lands they care about, development has emphatically 
not taken place’ (p.123). ‘Maslow is dead; there are no basic needs’, he 
concludes (p.123). The Human Development Approach would say that the 
range of valued freedoms determines the meaning of ‘development’—and 
typically includes mobility, community membership and participation, freedom 
from fear, freedom to decide, and so on. Most Basic Needs theorists would say 
that these features are basic needs, as determinable using many possible 
decision criteria or procedures. Doyal and Gough’s Theory of Need, for 
example, derives the features as implications of a priority commitment to the 
ability to function effectively as a member of one’s society. Uvin’s ringing 
assertion that there are no basic needs could lead us towards the relativism of 
pure consumer society, where my preference for a fifth home is morally 
indistinguishable from your wish for a first, and the decision procedure 
employed is to let us compete for housing in the market. We see here a link 
between much rights analysis’s weakly elaborated theoretical basis and its 
problems in prioritization. 
Eventually in the final few pages of his book, when seeking priorities, 
Uvin rapidly improvises a sort of basic needs position, under another name. To 
‘do at least something well’, development funders should engage ‘in each 
country in only three or four sectors, areas or goals, while staying entirely out 
of all the rest. These sectors could be chosen according to the specific and 
urgent needs of each country, or they could be set in a fixed manner for the 
whole world—there are advantages and disadvantages to each system. … A 
strong a priori [sic] would exist in favor of investing in education, nutrition, 
and health, as well as in doing so in rights terms. In other words, this approach 
would then amount to a basic rights approach, in which the international 
community seeks to guarantee every single person in the world access to the 
key elements of the right to life’ (Uvin, 2004: 199). This sounds very familiar to 
basic needs analysts. 
                                                 
8 Kenneth Boulding, Galtung, Haq, Stewart, and Streeten, for example--let alone 
Braybrooke, Deci & Ryan, Doyal & Gough, Maslow, Max-Neef, Penz, and Wisner—
are all absent from Uvin’s bibliography. 
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In contrast to HRBA and HD discourses, international humanitarianism 
has always openly affirmed and centred on concepts of need. ‘At each stage in 
its evolution, humanitarianism has forged and then relied upon consensus on 
core political values: people in need should be protected from life-threatening 
harm (the principle of humanity); aid should be distributed solely according to 
need (the principle of impartiality).’ (O’Brien, 2005: 202, emphases added). 
Needs discourse has been important too in analyses of conflict, and central in 
the disciplines of social policy, where ‘needs assessment’ is a continuing 
preoccupation. None of this implies that needs discourse is without major 
tensions and limitations (see e.g. Gasper, 2004). It suggests however that co-
operative alliances and mutual learning are the appropriate form of relationship 
between these various ‘human’ discourses.   
3 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN SECURITY 
Human Development Approach: Key Features 
The Human Development approach (HDA)—rooted in UNDP and led by 
Mahbub ul Haq, Amartya Sen and their associates—has been a central part of 
the move beyond a dominant focus on economic output and economic 
growth. GDP is a measure of monetized activity not of human well-being. 
HDA stresses the lack of adequate connection between levels of monetized 
activity and levels of well-being: there are many other determinants of well-
being, and frequently weak or unreliable or perverse links to well-being from 
economic growth. Part of GDP’s continuing attraction tacitly to national elites 
may be that it also measures power over others: the power of governments to 
acquire weaponry and military capability, and the power of elites to acquire 
property: land, real estate, rivals’ listed companies; the power to be heard, to 
travel, to communicate; powers to obtain, vet and disseminate research and 
information, buy control of mass media and buy influence more generally 
(sometimes with legislators, judges, police, and politicians who are in search of 
funds). 
Let us look here  at what HDA attends to instead, including its normative 
specifics, and both its contributions and gaps. I will comment (based on 
Gasper & Truong, 2005) on the approach of UNDP and its associates, not on 
Nussbaum’s distinctive version. 
 Human development thinking has broadened the range of objectives that 
are routinely considered in development debate and planning; and it 
reduces GDP from an end to be just one possible means or instrument.  
 Specific objectives are ideally to be derived through reasoned and public 
reflection.  
 It has espoused and exemplified a form of ‘joined-up thinking’ which is 
not misleadingly restricted by national and conventional disciplinary 
boundaries.  
 HDA also takes a step towards what might be termed ‘joined-up feeling’, 
for as in human rights philosophy the field of reference is all humans, 
irrespective of their location in the world.  
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 However, although it has a serious concern for equity, Haq’s HDA did not 
establish guarantees for individuals, in contrast to the human rights 
tradition. (See e.g. Jonsson, 2005: 59-60.) 
 Further, HDA presumes rather than directly constructs and succours a 
motivational basis for such concern. Does it preach only to the converted? 
 Underlying the previous two points, while Sen and Haq sought to move 
beyond mainstream economics, they aimed to bring most of its 
practitioners with them. The subtitle of the Journal of Human 
Development—‘Alternative Economics in Action’—reflected this 
disciplinary heritage and loyalty. Sen’s capability approach and the HDA 
mainstream thus still bear some economics-style features which many 
other audiences can find problematic. The slogans of ‘development as the 
expansion of capabilities’ and ‘Development as Freedom’ can be turned 
into a justification for consumerism.  
Ananta Giri has argued that Sen’s work lacks an adequate conception of 
personhood, personal growth, and human agency. ‘Development…also means 
self-development on the part of the free agents where they do not just assert 
the self-justificatory logic of their own freedom but are willing to subject it to a 
self- and mutual criticism’ (Giri, 2000: 1011.) Further, concerning a theory of 
mobilization and action, we have to move beyond ‘the technocratic approach 
to social policy in which rich nice people do nice things to poor nice people’ 
(Wood, 2003) and which assumes that those two are the only important social 
categories. The experience of independent India shows that formal political 
democracy certainly reduces famine but does not eliminate it; marginal 
minorities continue to be ignored. The struggle and empowerment orientations 
from human rights work are needed. 
For deepening its motivational basis and defence of individuals, its 
conceptions of personhood, self-development, public action and political 
struggle, HDA has stood to benefit from the human rights tradition, as well as 
from the full resources of the basic human needs stream and well-being 
research. These moves have been underway from the time that HDA was 
formulated, and have involved its founders, Haq and Sen and Nussbaum, and 
back-up from the institutions they have fostered. In particular, Haq and Sen 
tackled parts of this agenda in their entry into human security discourse.  
Human Security: Concept and Discourse; The Relation to 
HDA 
We saw how human development discourse decisively widened the range of 
development policy concern beyond economic growth. Mahbub ul Haq’s 
concept of ‘human security’, introduced in the Human Development Reports 
of 1993 and 1994 similarly tries to humanize the treatment of security. He took 
the distinction between the security of states and the security of persons 
further, by re-visioning the latter as not merely the physical safety of 
individuals but more broadly their ability to secure and hold basic goods. When 
Mary Robinson (2005) now talks of human security she refers to primarily to 
the ability to secure basics: health, safety, an education. The 2003 report 
prepared for the UN system by the Commission on Human Security, Human 
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Security Now (HSN, also known as the Ogata-Sen commission report)—
combines these elements to clarify the human security concept. Within [A] the 
widened range of concerns, the Human Development realm of reasoned 
freedoms, the concept provides [B] a focus on priorities, on basic human 
needs; including a concern with the physical security of persons (which was 
already present in the UNDP definition of human development); and [C] a 
concern for stability, not only averages and trends.  
Haq and Sen’s human security discourse is broader than a single concept. 
It synthesises concerns from basic needs, human development, and human 
rights. The other  elements of this human security (HS) discourse are: [D] a 
normative focus on individual persons’ lives and [E] an insistence on basic 
rights for all; and [F] an explanatory agenda that stresses the nexus between 
freedom from want and indignity and freedom from fear (Gasper, 2005a). 
Table 3 connects this itemization of features to the earlier characterization of 
human development discourse. 
TABLE 3 
A comparison of Human Development and Human Security (HSN) 
approaches 
 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT HUMAN SECURITY 
1: Broader range of objectives than GNP [D] A normative focus on individuals’ lives 
2: Focus on reasoned freedoms [A] Focus on reasoned freedoms… 
7: A more generalised and economics-
oriented language 
[B] In contrast, a focus on basic needs 
5. Serious concern for equity but without 
guarantees for individuals 
[E] In contrast, an insistence on basic 
rights for all, and 
 [C] A concern for stability as well as for 
levels 
3. Joined up thinking [F] Nexus between freedoms from want 
and indignity and freedom from fear 
4. Joined up feeling but… [G] Joined up feeling (cosmopolitan 
concern) 
5. …the motivational basis is presumed 
rather than constructed 
D, B, E Æ stronger motivational basis, 
mobilizing attention and concern, and 
sustaining [G] 
 
 
Overall, ‘The human security discourse is a discourse for getting priority, 
and priorities, in national and international policy. … The HS discourse 
includes, besides the concept, strong attention to the interconnections between 
conventionally separated spheres, which helps it to link diverse organizational 
[and disciplinary] worlds; and a motivating focus on human vulnerability and 
the human rights that flow for every human being from basic human needs.’ 
(Gasper, 2005a: 241-2). The HS discourse both rests on the Basic Human 
Needs work in which Haq was prominent, and adds to it, and shows the 
 22
consistency of the human development, human needs and human rights 
languages.  
For the types of ‘boundary work’ which the concept and discourse 
attempt, intellectually, emotionally, ethically and politically, there are threats as 
well as opportunities implicit in security language. The ‘human security’ label 
well matches the contents and purpose of the concept and discourse, but it is 
competed for by national security studies; and the associated policy agenda is at 
risk of distortion by the psychological insecurities of the rich. We discuss this 
later.  
The Human Security Framework in Use 
Jolly and BasuRay (2007) review various criticisms of the UNDP-Haq 
treatment of Human Security, in the light of thirteen examples of national 
Human Development Reports [NHDRs] which have taken human security as 
lead theme. These cover a wide range of countries, from Latvia to the 
Philippines to Mozambique. Has the approach added value? They itemize the 
criticisms (p.459; italicized below) and comment on each in turn. 
1. ‘Human security, they [the critics] argue, merely involves renaming problems which have 
already been recognised in other contexts and which already have perfectly good names. What 
is gained by combining them together under a new label?’. Jolly and BasuRay find 
significant benefits from ‘joined-up thinking’: ‘Almost all the reports develop 
links between [physical] security, human security and development as an 
integrated whole’ (p. 462). The reports generate significantly different priorities 
between countries and compared to what outsiders might have expected in 
advance.  
2. ‘Human Security does not have any definite parameters, therefore anything and everything 
could be considered as a risk to security.’ Finding: ‘The human security approach 
strives to contextualise this understanding of security in order to develop 
appropriate policy responses. The NHDR reports show that such a process is 
entirely possible, and reveals a far more comprehensive picture of the security 
needs and situations of individuals than a state-based approach would do’ (p. 
463). Again in effect the argument is that joined-up thinking better reflects 
reality and leads us to helpfully see things afresh. 
3. ‘Human security, when broadened to include issues like climate change and health, 
complicates the international machinery for reaching decisions or taking action in relation to 
the threats identified.’ Jolly and BasuRay respond that indeed: ‘Decision making 
and implementation of a much broader approach will neither be easy nor 
always fit easily within conventional thinking and procedures. On the other 
hand, if the causes of insecurity have broadened, if new issues of human 
security have displaced traditional threats, it would be absurd to continue along 
old routes, rather than finding new ways to deal with new problems’ (p. 465). 
The NDHRs illustrate how this can fruitfully be done. O’Brien (2006) argues 
similarly with specific respect to climate change, showing how the focus on 
persons helpfully breaks away from conventional nation-centred analyses. 
4. ‘Human security risks engaging the military in issues best tackled through non-military 
means.’ Jolly and BasuRay found no support for this from the NHDRs. They 
note that the UN and many supporters of a human security approach 
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emphatically oppose the (military) securitization of development, as typically 
counterproductive, and show in detail how the approach instead generates 
alternative policy implications. 
5. ‘Human security under the UN risks raising hopes about the UN’s capacity, which it 
cannot fulfil.’ The study is more sanguine. It dispels the notion that an HS 
approach implies ‘centralised decision-making—let alone taking all issues to 
the Security Council’ (p. 469). Human security analysis and programming, like 
human rights analysis, will not be limited to a single milieu.   
‘The paper concludes that the UNDP concept of human security, when 
applied at national level, is both robust in showing answers to these criticisms 
and operationally useful in identifying policy measures and action to tackle 
serious problems of insecurity of people within the countries concerned.’ (Jolly 
& BasuRay, 2007: 459). 
Seen from some other corners, the UNDP version of Human Security 
discourse may not only be viewed less favourably, it may not register at all. 
Almost none of the human rights authors whose work has been used in this 
paper seem to give it any attention.9 They work instead with a concept 
exclusively of physical security of persons. 
4 ASSESSMENT OF HR, HD AND HS DISCOURSES: TOWARDS 
A SWOT ANALYSIS 
Let us review and compare the policy discourses we have discussed, with 
special reference to human rights based approaches and the Haq-Sen 
conception of human security. My intent is not to fashion a superdiscourse 
that serves all purposes best, but rather to further mutual insight and 
cooperation. Multiple intellectual and policy communities, operating in a 
variety of niches across complex and diverse social, political and operational 
environments, are each busy with their own particular tasks and challenges. We 
need not think of intellectual unification, but can promote more fruitful 
exchange.  
Human Rights discourse has enormous strengths. It appears readily 
understandable and near universally acceptable as a format, by ordinary people 
as well as officially by governments. The worldwide Voices of the Poor study 
generates a set of priorities close to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, suggest both James Wolfensohn (2005) and Darrow & Tomas (2005). 
Further, in operational terms, HR discourse provides a rallying call and a set of 
benchmarks which have definite, specific content, that do not allow the 
normative thrust to dissolve into nothing. It is connected to a vast legal 
apparatus, and is yet at the same time more struggle oriented than most 
development discourse. As Wood reminds us (2003), typically the poor must 
                                                 
9 See for example even the valuable surveys by Marks (2005) and Andreassen and 
Marks (2006). 
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confront the privileged and act with strength in order to be able to turn 
claimed or declared rights into delivered, honoured, entitlements. 
Human Rights discourse has also had serious shortcomings and dangers, 
mentioned in Section 2. The weapon of struggle can become a weapon of 
struggle for privilege. The tactical vagueness around the justification of human 
rights can sometimes become a major problem in face of conflicting 
interpretations and limited resources. A rights approach may steer and 
constrain action by reliance on an enormously costly and remote legal system. 
However only HR approaches which centre on the legal system can be stifled 
in the legal embrace. Characteristic of recent Human Rights Based Approaches 
is that they seek to avoid this.  
Urban Jonsson argues as follows (Jonsson, 2005: 59-60):  
There is an emerging consensus that HRBAP [a human rights based approach to 
programming] has significant advantages compared to basic needs and human 
development approaches to programming. … 1. Increased accountability as a 
result of explicitly defined claim-duty relationships. These are different from 
entitlements which do not identify any specific duty bearer. A duty is also 
different from a promise or an interest.  2. HRBAP makes most good 
programming practice obligatory, and not just optional. …. 
In these first two features we see a sort of management thinking added to 
ethical aspirations (see also ICHRP, 2005). 
3. HRBAP offers better protection of people who are poor by ruling out trade-
offs that are harmful to them. … HRBAP, therefore, pays more attention to 
exclusion, discrimination, disparities and injustice, and emphasizes basic causes’ 
(Jonsson, 2005: 60)  
As we saw, this insistence structures planning and policy assessment so as to 
put an onus on creativity to find ways forward that do not harm poor people, 
rather than structuring assessment so as to easily permit sacrifice of the poor. It 
leaves some difficulties that we observed.  
 While the above points are characteristic of all human rights 
approaches, Jonsson’s point 4 is more characteristic of HRBA: it aims to 
engage the power of the law but not rely on ‘the legal reflex’. In the final point 
below we will see that it still aims very high. 
4. HRBAP focuses on legal and institutional reform, and promotes the rule of 
law. … In HRBAP, justice is seen as a social process, not just a legal one. ….  6. 
In a human rights approach to development, development assistance can no 
longer be based on charity or solidarity only; it will be a result of national and 
international obligations … (loc. cit.). 
Jonsson would likely agree with Gready and Ensor’s judgement that ‘Not 
only are human rights possibly reinventing development, but development has 
the potential to reinvent human rights’ (2005: 14). The tendency in his 
presentation though is to see the issue as either-or—choose this discourse or 
that—not in terms of complementarity and of distinct roles in distinct niches.  
RBAs are easy to elaborate on paper. In practice no mechanical project 
planning package will be adequate (Uvin, 2004: Ch.5). How, for example, do 
we choose a manageable focus within a ‘joined-up thinking’ which seems to 
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indicate connections of everything to everything else? Here Sen’s entitlements 
analysis has been one major and acknowledged inspiration and exemplar for 
HRBA work. Not all that work however shows familiarity with the relevant 
literature and tools (e.g. Uvin, 2004: 161 ff.). Uvin argues elsewhere that Sen’s 
Development as Freedom is beloved in aid agencies because it combines 
uplifting talk with no specific operational commitments (p.126). Yet what he 
sketches briefly himself (p.161 on), for tracing causes and effects in terms of 
human rights impacts, treads just the sort of path that Sen’s entitlements 
analysis opened up (see e.g. Drèze & Sen, 1989; Gasper, 2007b). If ‘An RBA is 
about promoting the establishment and strengthening of formal and informal, 
legal and nonlegal mechanisms of creating and enforcing claims’ (Uvin, 2004: 
182), then it is the daughter or younger sister of entitlements analysis (see e.g. 
Gasper, 1993). Insofar as HRBAs centre on political struggle, not legal claims, 
they may indeed go further; with human rights seen as mental tools that 
provide direction, moral energy and motivation, but never a substitute for 
political struggle (Uvin, 2004: 176). Rights plus empowerment create 
entitlements. 
Compared to the Human Development Approach, human rights 
approaches provide stronger motivating force and greater guarantees for 
individuals. Their roots in natural rights argumentation provide intrinsic as well 
as instrumental arguments for rights (see e.g. Gready & Ensor, 2005). The 
HDA, including entitlements and capability analysis, has however provided a 
framework for joined-up thinking that rights approaches require, plus more 
willingness and facility to engage with the frequent inevitability of trade-offs, 
partly thanks to its roots in basic needs theory. If basic needs too become 
defined very extensively and as absolute rights, essential and indivisible, then 
the problem reemerges. 
Human Security discourse confronts head-on the importance of 
prioritization. It has several strengths, arising out of its attempt to synthesise 
and undertake ‘boundary work’ at the interfaces of needs, rights, peace and 
freedoms. We can identify and cultivate a range of strategies incorporated in 
HS discourse seen as a discourse in politics:  
 First, the ethical appeal to human sympathy and solidarity (asking ‘whose 
security?’), including both justice/fairness concerns and virtue/solidarity 
concerns: ‘joined-up feeling’.  
 Compared to HDA the human security discourse may have greater 
motivating power, through its focus on substantive priority areas. Further, 
the focus on such issues—of violence, disease, trafficking, and so on—
may also produce richer and more probing analyses than in some HDA 
work: motivation enriches analysis as well as action. (Compare perhaps the 
journal Disasters with the Journal of Human Development.)  
 Its probing of the roots of national and global tensions and conflicts 
provides arguments to the rich and privileged for change on grounds of 
prudence, not only (but also) on grounds of justice and sympathy. This 
‘joined-up thinking’ raises questions about the viability of a gated enclave 
society and asks ‘Will action X really increase your longer-term security?’.  
 Drawing on Human Development research and the growing tide of well-
being work, the Human Security approach at the same time reconsiders 
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the nature of well-being and therefore of prudence and self-interest, asking 
what are real human interests, which routes promote them and which fail 
to do so and in fact endanger them.  
How are those four types of probing undertaken and communicated? By 
joined-up talking, ‘boundary work’, that seeks long-term influence on mental 
frameworks by using new and old professional networks. 
But in addition, HS work contains the struggle orientation of providing 
and employing tools for establishing and demanding accountability: notably via 
human rights law, the MDGs, the SPHERE convention, and so on. 
There are continuing worries over human security discourse. Don’t we 
have enough languages already? Is this one not too vague, too broad-ranging, 
too overlapping and competitive with other languages? I suggest elsewhere that 
this is not so (Gasper, 2005a). Further, however, does adoption of the ‘security’ 
label make us fight on the wrong terrain? The danger in boundary work is of 
conceding too much, in order to be heard. Lakoff advise: ‘Don’t Think of an 
Elephant!’:  
To negate a frame is to accept that frame. … To carry out the instruction ‘Don’t 
think of an elephant’ you have to think of an elephant. Rebuttal is not reframing. 
You have to impose your own framing before you can successfully rebut. The 
facts themselves won’t set you free. You have to frame facts properly before they 
can have the meaning you want them to convey. (Lakoff: 2002: 419-20) 
Does taking over the ‘security’ label render the human security approach too 
capturable by the fears and agendas of the rich? Part of HS strategy has been to 
make the rich see that war, disease, and insecurity are often promoted by some 
aspects of the rich’s present postures. Unfortunately, the psychic fears of the 
rich are not well correlated with objective measures of security/insecurity. 
Heightened fears may contribute to a search for psychic security through 
group affiliation and ‘other-ing’: the mental creation and real exclusion of ‘the 
other’.   
A short response to these worries is that human security discourse needs 
to continue partnered by human rights approaches and human development 
analysis. A supplementary longer answer could run as follows. The anti-terror 
agenda is already with us, and the question is how to counter its predominating 
mindset. It is hard to see how one can leave for others the key terrain and 
rhetorical trump-card of ‘security’, just as we cannot abandon the key 
discursive terrains of ‘development’, ‘human’, and freedom’. Sen’s success has 
been by taking freedom seriously, always asking: Whose freedom? What are the 
preconditions for meaningful freedom? and What balance of different 
freedoms? Similarly with ‘security’, we have to constantly ask: Whose security? 
[including via applying Joined-up Feeling] and Will such-and-such measures by 
the rich really increase their security? [Joined-up Thinking]. One aim is to 
humanize and influence the military and security worlds, through wider 
thinking and feeling, induced by direct communication and through feeding 
public pressure. As Caroline Thomas (2004) remarked, this strategy rests on a 
testable hypothesis. 
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Clearly, human security discourse should extend to systematically deal with 
subjective insecurity. Since security is both objective and subjective, HS 
discourse may presently walk on only one leg. . 
A second reason for more attention to emotions and motivations is to 
ground and sustain ‘joined-up feeling’. HS work contains a methodological gap 
regarding building and maintenance of concern. It requires a methodological 
broadening, to partner its broadened scope in terms of themes and sectors. 
This calls for methods from the arts and humanities, including methods with 
emotional depth such as life narrative and intimate studies of life spheres. 
Schaffer and Sidonie (2004) argue that there are major interconnections 
between the rise of human rights discourse and the parallel rise of accounts of 
individual lives. We need to deepen the understanding of and feeling for 
‘human’, not only deepen the analysis of development and of security.  
This connects us to a bigger agenda of Human Development, such as in 
Nussbaum’s work. For what, let us suppose, if people show little interest in 
their contemporaries and in future generations? Both ethical appeals and 
prudence appeals involve trying to re-frame the way that privileged people 
conventionally think: including reconfiguring how they think about ‘self’, ‘us’, 
‘interests’ and therefore ‘self-interest’. Human Security Now spells out such a 
policy and research agenda (CHS, 2003: 122-142), including for education on 
human rights, shared human identity and diverse social identities, 
interdependence, and mutual respect – education that should include ‘the 
police, the armed forces, private security forces and others with access to the 
means of coercive force’ (CHS, 2003: 122).   
Human security discourse brings in the themes of ‘caring systems’ – 
examination of how far principles of care can be embodied in welfare systems 
at levels other than the family – and ‘well-being regimes’ (Wood & Newton, 
2005), going beyond the study of ‘welfare regimes’ based on intra-North 
comparisons (e.g. USA–Germany–Scandinavia), to a more comprehensive 
examination of the systems, extant or conceivable, that promote or, especially, 
prevent well-being. 
The human security thrust initiated by Haq and sustained by figures like 
Jolly and organizations like UNICEF has perhaps its largest current expression 
in the MDGs. The MDGs are manifestly crude and top-down targets. Their 
rationale appears to be political, as accountable commitments, with 
accountability both domestically and internationally. Haq was not a patient 
man. He wished to set definite targets against which those in authority would 
be held accountable. If the targets work directly, well and good; if the targets 
are not achieved the implicit (‘win/win’) hypothesis was that this would bring 
down a cleansing public wrath—with a gamble that it does not instead lead to 
total disillusion. How good or bad the MDGs are as an operationalisation of a 
human security agenda is open to debate and experience. They are only one of 
the possible means for pursuing it. 
Alston (2005) calls both for enrichment of MDG work by ideas and inputs 
from human rights bodies, and for focusing scattered human rights work by 
reference to the MDGs. He adjudges that the MDGs have better potential to 
become customary international law than do the full International Human 
Rights (IHRs) package (p. 773). Human rights purists attack the MDGs for 
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being too narrow (not covering all the stated IHRs) and too minimal, which is 
the opposite of the widespread claim by others that they are unrealistic and 
unattainable. These critics ignore the issues of necessary prioritisation and 
coalition building around targets that can motivate, that stretch but do not 
strain to breaking point.  
5 CONCLUSION 
We do not face either-or choices between these discourses, but instead a need 
for effective alliances within a family of valuable discourses, based on co-
operation and mutual learning. These can build a bigger picture, an 
ecumenicism in place of sectarianism. Disagreements can be valuable provided 
they drive investigation rather than close it off. Some valuable integrated 
perspectives for analysis and policy already exist.10  
A summary of the paper’s central points is provided in Table 4. It broadly 
follows the sequence of the paper. For each of human rights, human 
development and human security discourses it highlights major merits, in the 
first column. The enumeration of points is based on and extends that in Table 
3. The second column summarises major dangers that have been mentioned. 
Where relevant these are matched to corresponding merits. More especially the 
dangers are matched horizontally to possible responses, listed in the third 
column. This provides, I hope, a fuller and more balanced ‘balance-sheet’ than 
others currently available (see e.g. ICHRP, 2005). It indicates the required 
partnership of the three discourses. 
Further work on the various human discourses’ respective roles and 
complementarity can investigate to which organizational and discursive niches, 
levels or functions particular discourses and variants best fit. Some discourses 
are more global-level; some discourses might fit better, or require adaptation, 
for another level and niche: national, local, organizational, household or 
personal. With respect for example to the vital interface between human rights 
and property rights, human rights discourses have to mould the policy contexts 
and practice contexts in which property rights are interpreted and applied. The 
principle of non-retrogression has to be refined and focused. Further, each of 
the discourses possesses considerable openness of meaning and contains 
various potentials. We have to study the usages in practice and the practices in 
use. A more detailed intellectual history of, for example, the various notions of 
‘rights-based approach’ might yield interesting insights. 
                                                 
10 For example, David Held’s ‘Global Covenant’ project matches human security (pp. 
xiii, 110-11, 148, 174-5) and human rights (pp. 56, 125, 137, 170 ff.) frameworks. 
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TABLE 4 
Comparative overview 
 MERITS DANGERS RESPONSES? 
Human Rights 
approaches 
(HRA; section 2 
above) 
I - Even stronger focus on 
the person than in HDA 
 
II - Stronger mobilizing 
force (for helpers and for 
oppressed); grounded in 
fundamental perceptions 
III - Stronger guarantee; 
‘do no harm principle’. 
Defence for the weak. 
IV - Stronger guarantee: 
specific right and specific 
duty 
 
V - Massive established 
organisational & 
institutional infrastructure 
 
 
 
VI – Can rechannel our 
attention in policy analysis 
(HRBA) 
i - Traditional domination 
by civil and political rights 
 
ii - Crude universalism 
iii - Vagueness of 
grounding 
 
iv - Absolutism and 
Panglossian dogmatism: 
an unwillingness to 
theorise trade-offs can 
become defence of 
privilege 
v – Inertia of a legal 
system in which 
presumption of rectitude 
lies with existing 
property-holders, and 
which is only accessible 
to or capturable by the 
privileged?  
vi – Capture of human 
rights language by 
litigationist me-first 
property-rights culture? 
i. The stress on 
indivisibility of rights; but 
also must be partnered by 
HDA, HSA. 
ii. In practice, flexible. 
iii. Partnership with needs 
theory. 
iv. To be guided by HS in 
prioritizing. 
 
 
 
 
 
v, vi. Can HRBA avoid all 
this? Æ  
by avoiding ‘the legal 
reflex’, being a multi-level 
approach; 
Human Responsibilities 
discourse 
Human 
Development 
approach 
(HDA; section 3 
above) 
1. Broader range of 
objectives than GNP;  
underlain by concern for 
individuals’ lives 
2. Focus on reasoned 
freedoms 
3. Joined up thinking 
(JUT) 
4. Joined up feeling (JUF; 
cosmopolitan concern) 
but…(Æ5) 
7. A more generalised 
and economics-oriented 
language  
6. Serious concern for 
equity but without 
guarantees for 
individuals  
5. …motivational basis 
presumed rather than 
constructed. 
7 cont. Limited 
conceptual basis? 
* Consumerist potential 
* but includes 
‘development by the 
people’ 
- To be partnered by 
human security approach, 
MDGs. 
- To be partnered by 
human rights approach 
 
 
- To be partnered by HSA, 
HRA, deeper reflection on 
‘human’, and link to well-
being research 
 
- Link to human rights-
based approaches 
(HRBA) 
Human 
Security 
approach 
(HSA; section 3 
above; italics 
indicate 
extensions 
beyond HDA) 
[F] JUT: Nexus between 
freedoms from want and 
indignity and freedom from 
fear 
[A] Focus on reasoned 
freedoms 
[B] A focus on basic needs 
[C] A concern for stability 
as well as levels 
[D] Heightened normative 
focus on individuals’ lives 
[E] Basic rights for all. 
D, B, E Æ stronger 
motivational basis, 
mobilizing attention and 
concern: sustaining [G]: 
Joined-up feeling. 
Is the nexus sufficiently 
demonstrable?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Is security talk ‘Thinking 
of an Elephant?’ 
Capturable by psychic 
fears and agenda of the 
rich? 
 
JUT, JUF, plus: 
Work on rethinking 
identity and well-being 
Extension to consider 
subjective insecurity 
Methodological 
broadening 
Deliberate investments in 
boundary work 
Struggle orientation; 
establishing criteria and 
demanding accountability 
Partnership with HDA & 
HRBA 
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